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EDELIN: THE REMAKING OF THE HEADLINE ABORTION TRIAL 
MARY ZIEGLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
When did we leave the era of headline abortion trials behind us?  
Conventional historical accounts suggest that high-profile criminal trials were 
a defining feature of the legal and political landscape before Roe.1  Although 
relatively infrequent before Roe, blockbuster trials had tremendous symbolic 
importance, offering evidence of when abortion would be publicly denounced 
rather than privately tolerated.2  Notorious abortion trials fell into several 
different categories: soap operas involving complex social entanglements and 
prosecutions of practitioners who were celebrities in their own right.3 
 
* Mary Ziegler is an assistant professor at Saint Louis University School of Law.  She uses legal 
history to explore battles about abortion, sexuality, marriage, and divorce. 
 1. For discussion of abortion trials, see generally LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION 
WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867–1973, at 113–93 
(1997); JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND 
ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 139–97 (Gend. & Am. Culture Ser., 2005); Rickie 
Solinger, Extreme Danger: Women Abortionists and Their Clients Before Roe v. Wade, in NOT 
JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN IN POST-WAR AMERICA, 1945–1960, at 335 (Critical Perspectives on 
the Past Ser., Joanne Meyerowitz ed., 1994); Rickie Solinger, Pregnancy and Power Before Roe 
v. Wade, 1950–1970, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000, at 15, 
17–20 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998) [hereinafter Solinger, Pregnancy and Power]. 
 2. See generally REAGAN, supra note 1, at 1–18 (explaining the inconsistent and culturally 
contingent enforcement of criminal prohibitions on abortion); SCHOEN, supra note 1, at 163–64 
(describing the inconsistency of abortion prosecutions). 
 3. For examples of these different types of celebrity abortion trials, see Find 2 Guilty in 
Conspiracy Abortion Trial, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 2, 1949, at 2 (prosecution of recognized 
practitioner with ex-police officer as co-defendant in separate trial); Marino Acquitted in Fatal 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1942, at 23 (detailing prosecution of defendant active in 
community and a captain in the Army Medical Corps); David H. Orro, Physician Gets 15-Year 
Sentence for Murder, CHI. DEFENDER, Jan. 27, 1940, at 2 (describing abortion trial of prominent 
doctor also involved in the murder of a family friend); Two Women Go on Trial Today in 
Abortion Case, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 14, 1941, at 8 [hereinafter Two Women] (describing the 
connection between an investigation into an abortion ring and a murder, two suicides, and the 
dismissal of two assistant state’s attorneys). 
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Roe v. Wade is thought to have put an end to the era of the high-profile 
abortion trial.4  In announcing a constitutional right to abortion, Roe is seen to 
have decriminalized abortion, setting in motion a new debate about how, when, 
and why abortion could be restricted.5 
However, the conventional historical account of the role of criminal trials 
in abortion law is fundamentally incomplete.  Roe did not end the era of 
blockbuster criminal trials, but the decision changed what was at stake in them.  
Centrally, in the 1974–1975 trial of Dr. Kenneth Edelin, a Boston physician 
convicted of manslaughter after performing an abortion, advocacy groups, 
politicians, and the press debated what Roe would actually mean in practice.6  
As the Edelin trial showed, blockbuster criminal trials no longer served to 
illustrate when abortion was a crime but instead highlighted what protections 
abortion rights provided and to whom they belonged. 
There is a good deal at stake in understanding the history of Edelin and 
other headline abortion trials after Roe.7  Conventional histories cite Roe’s 
decriminalization of abortion in highlighting the Supreme Court’s power and 
relevance in the abortion debate.8  In particular, by focusing on 
 
 4. REAGAN, supra note 1, at 245; see also Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of 
Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE  SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS 
REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2004) (discussing 
Roe’s action to strike down of most of the abortion laws of the states); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 140 (1990) (noting that Roe decriminalized abortion 
under the laws of most states). 
 5.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 6. For an introduction to the trial of Dr. Edelin, see Peter Stoler, A Case Célèbre, TIME 
MAG., June 5, 1978, at 93 (reviewing WILLIAM A. NOLEN, M.D., THE BABY IN THE BOTTLE 
(1978)). 
 7. There were other trials of physicians in the period.  See, e.g., Dexter Duggan, Doctor 
Accused in Strangling Death of Baby Born Alive After An Abortion, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, 
May 1977, at 1 (detailing the trial of Dr. William Baxter Waddill Jr. for the murder of an 
allegedly viable fetus).  However, as we shall see, the Edelin trial attracted much more press 
attention.  Moreover, as I will argue, Edelin represented a more direct challenge to conventional 
interpretations of Roe.  Consequently, understanding Edelin is crucial to any account of headline 
abortion trials in the period. 
 8. In summarizing critical views of Roe on this subject, Edward Keynes and Randall Miller 
write that, in Roe, the Supreme Court is argued to have “abandoned self-restraint, usurped the 
legislative powers of Congress and the states, and exceeded the constitutional scope of judicial 
power.”  EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, 
BUSING, AND ABORTION 246 (1989); see also Donald P. Kommers, American Courts and 
Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, in The JUDICIAL BRANCH 200, 210 (Kermit L. Hall & 
Kevin T. McGuire eds., Insts. Of Am. Democracy Ser., 2005); George Will, Judicial Power and 
Abortion Politics, in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192, 193 (Robert P. George ed., 
2000) (describing the court’s decision as “mow[ing] down the abortion laws of all fifty states”). 
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decriminalization, critics of the opinion attack the Roe Court’s arrogance, 
overreaching, or political obtuseness.9 
However, as the history of the Edelin trial suggests, the decriminalization 
of most abortions and the definition of abortion rights were not accomplished 
by court edict.  The decriminalization of routine abortions occurred only after 
debate and negotiation between advocacy groups.  Organizations on both sides 
of the issue participated in and publicized the Edelin trial.  Because of the 
media attention it attracted, Edelin promised to be a platform for organizations 
wishing to promote their own understandings of Roe, arguments about 
abortion, and characterizations of those on the other side of the issue.  But 
Edelin proved that the headline trial could be a double-edged sword for 
advocacy groups.  Neither proponents nor opponents of Roe could control how 
the media presented Edelin or how the public understood it.  Because of this, 
groups like the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA), the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the National Right to Life 
Committee (NRLC) became disenchanted with Edelin and trials like it. 
These groups had to lose interest in headline trials like Edelin before they 
became a thing of the past.  Understanding the history of the Edelin trial shows 
that concern about Roe’s overreaching may be overstated.  If the story of Roe 
is a cautionary tale, that story is not primarily one about the dangers of judicial 
power. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I examines the conventional 
historical account of Roe’s role in eliminating criminal abortion trials.  Part II 
uses the prominent Edelin trial to challenge this account.  This section shows 
that, after Roe, criminal abortion trials no longer focused on when abortion 
prohibitions would be enforced but instead on what abortion rights would 
mean.  Part III briefly concludes. 
I.  THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
What do we mean when we say that Roe v. Wade decriminalized abortion?  
For some critics, the answer is that Roe ended an era of abortion trials.10  
Headline prosecutions have long been considered the hallmark of the era 
 
 9. For examples of this account of Roe, see RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: 
PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW 115 (1992) (arguing that Roe prohibited any 
societal or congressional dialogue about abortion); FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE OF THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE 
AGE 50 (1999) (describing Roe as a sweeping and unanticipated decision); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Judges and Democracy: The Changing Role of the United States Supreme Court, in THE 
JUDICIAL BRANCH, supra note 8, at 32, 56 (describing criticisms that contend “[Roe] is more like 
Dred Scott: an unsuccessful and morally abhorrent effort . . . .”). 
 10. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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before Roe.11  In the period before the Supreme Court’s decision, all abortions 
were criminal, but in practice, criminal prosecutions were sporadic.12 
Perhaps the most famous headline abortion trial of all was one that took 
place before the end of the nineteenth century.  The trial involved the notorious 
New York abortion practitioner: Madame Restell (an assumed name).13  
Restell’s various trials made headlines because of the luxurious lifestyle she 
appeared to lead.  She favored expensive jewelry and made use of elaborate 
transoms when travelling to court.14  On one occasion, while awaiting trial, her 
accommodations in jail were so opulent that several prison officials were 
almost fired.15  Ultimately, after Anthony Comstock had successfully pursued 
Restell and made her prosecution a part of his effort to restore morals 
regulations in New York, she cut her throat to avoid a conviction.16  The gory 
details notwithstanding, each of her trials made headlines because Madame 
Restell was a headline in her own right.17  As the press put it at the time, she 
was “the wickedest woman in New York.”18 
Though there were some variations in the general character of abortion 
prosecutions before Roe, Restell’s prosecution was typical of the state of 
headline abortion trials in the nineteenth century.  After the criminalization of 
abortion in many states, trials proceeded according to what Lawrence 
Friedman has called the “Victorian compromise”19: only a handful of abortion 
patients or providers were prosecuted, and often, only the most egregious 
offenders were pursued.20  As Johanna Schoen has demonstrated in her studies 
of abortion in North Carolina, the target of abortion prosecutions changed over 
time, as prosecutors focused first on women’s sexual partners, then on abortion 
providers, and finally, at least to some extent, on women themselves.21  
 
 11. See generally REAGAN, supra note 1, at 113–93. 
 12. Solinger, Pregnancy and Power, supra note 1, at 17. 
 13. Geoffrey C. Ward, Close-Mouthed but Flamboyant, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1988, at BR25 
(reviewing CLIFFORD BROWDER, THE WICKEDEST WOMAN IN NEW YORK: MADAME RESTELL, 
THE ABORTIONIST (1988)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  See also NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND 
FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 13, 26 (Princeton Studies in Am. Politics Ser., 
1997) (describing how in the nineteenth century, Anthony Comstock became renowned as a 
crusader for “morals laws” on matters from pornography to birth control). 
 17. Ward, supra note 13. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The “Victorian compromise” is an idea that certain vices were inevitably part of society, 
and authorities “accepted them as part of urban life.”  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING 
LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND 
PRIVACY 66–67 (2007). 
 20. See Solinger, Pregnancy and Power, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 21. See SCHOEN, supra note 1, at 156, 163. 
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Although there was a general crackdown on black-market abortions in the 
1940s and 1950s, abortion prosecutions remained rare in the decades before 
Roe.22 
Abortion trials across these periods became famous for different reasons.  
In some cases, abortion trials revealed titillating details about the “dark side” 
of respectable society.  For example, in New York in 1871, the press was 
riveted by the trial of Dr. Anne Byrnes, a well-thought-of, older doctor accused 
of performing illicit abortions in her house, one of which killed a young 
woman named Mary Russell.23  Years later, in Chicago in 1937, Dr. Morgan 
Turner, a prominent physician and candidate for public office, was charged 
with “murder by abortion” and made eligible for the death penalty.24 
Other celebrity abortion trials gained notoriety because of the shocking 
details revealed at trial.  Accused of murder by abortion in 1940, Dr. Ernest 
Martin, a well-known Chicago area physician, was accused of shooting a 
former client, Anna Balinski, post-mortem in order to cover up her death 
during an abortion procedure that he had performed.25  The trial of Ada Martin 
(no relation) in 1941–1942 had elements of both soap opera and tragedy: the 
proceedings covered a murder, two suicides, and the dismissal of two Assistant 
State’s Attorneys.26 
A final kind of trial became famous because of a public sense that justice 
had been denied.  For example, Dr. Lou Davis of Chicago, tried in 1937, had 
already been prosecuted and arrested seemingly innumerable times, but none 
of the accusations against her had yet led to a conviction.27 
Roe itself is seen to have eliminated this kind of headline trial and to have 
transformed the relationship between abortion and the criminal law.28  
According to a conventional historical account, Roe dismantled the vast 
majority of criminal abortion laws in a single opinion.29  Because of that 
opinion, women had unprecedented access to safe and legal abortion, primarily 
because practicing physicians could act without fear of liability.  Writing in 
this vein, Jack M. Balkin has explained that “Roe v. Wade struck down the 
 
 22. Id. at 163–64. 
 23. The Evil of the Age—The Trial of Mrs. Byrnes for Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1871, 
at 3. 
 24. Pick Death Jury to Try Physician in Abortion Case, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 26, 1937, at 
4. 
 25. Orro, supra note 3. 
 26. Two Women, supra note 3. 
 27. See Woman Freed in 3D Abortion Murder Trial, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 4, 1937, at 21; 
see also Death in Chair Demanded for Woman Doctor, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 13, 1936, at 4 
(recounting a similar story). 
 28. See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing Roe’s action to end abortion 
trials by decriminalizing the practice). 
 29. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 140. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1384 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1379 
abortion laws of most states in a single opinion.”30  Political scientist 
Rosemary Nossiff agrees that “Roe decriminalized early abortions.”31  
Laurence Tribe similarly has written that “[w]hat was an expensive and often 
brutal black market . . . would be transformed by Roe . . . .”32 and prominent 
human rights attorney Janet Benshoof has stated that “Roe v. Wade has 
transformed abortion from a clandestine and dangerous ordeal into one of the 
safest medical procedures in the United States.”33  In her authoritative study of 
illegal abortion, Leslie Reagan succinctly summarizes this view: “Roe v. Wade 
and Doe v. Bolton ended an era of illegal abortion.”34 
It can be assumed that, because of Roe, the number of criminal abortion 
prosecutions dropped steeply.35  However, Roe did not end headline abortion 
trials, at least not in the 1970s.  As we shall see, there were a considerable 
number of abortion prosecutions in the years immediately after Roe, many of 
them involving midwives and other abortion practitioners without a medical 
license.  Roe itself permitted states to criminalize abortions performed by non-
physicians.36  The Court explained: “The State may define the term 
‘physician’ . . . to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and 
may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so 
defined.”37 
For example, Verdell Wright, a Florida nurse, was successfully convicted 
of “unlawful termination of a pregnancy resulting in [a] woman’s death” after 
her patient died.38  Betty Norflett, a New Jersey midwife, attempted two 
abortion procedures on a seventeen-year-old woman, ultimately leading to the 
woman’s hospitalization and absence from school for two months.39  Norflett 
was successfully prosecuted for performing an abortion without lawful 
justification, assault and battery, and contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor.40  Mario Guerrieri, an Ohio layman, was convicted of possessing a 
 
 30. Balkin, supra note 4, at 3. 
 31. ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 143 (2001). 
 32. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 140. 
 33. Janet Benshoof, The Legacy of Roe v. Wade, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 35 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984). 
 34. REAGAN, supra note 1, at 245. 
 35. The availability of facilities providing abortions just a decade after Roe testifies to this 
fact: by 1982, for example, there were nearly 3,000 hospitals or freestanding clinics willing to 
provide abortions.  JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN 
ABORTION WAR 106 (1998). 
 36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Wright v. State, 351 So. 2d 708, 710–11 (Fla. 1977). 
 39. State v. Norflett, 337 A.2d 609, 611–612 (N.J. 1975). 
 40. Id. at 611, 613, 620. 
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device conventionally used to perform abortions.41  For the most part, these 
prosecutions unfolded with little public scrutiny.  The lack of media attention 
is easily explained: the prosecution of non-physicians seems to be clearly 
permissible under Roe.42 
By contrast, the prosecution and conviction of Dr. Kenneth Edelin 
attracted significant attention in the courts, the media, and advocacy-group 
circles.43  As Time Magazine put it, Edelin was certainly a “case célèbre.”44 
An African-American physician, Edelin was the Chief Resident in 
Obstetrics and Gynecology at Boston’s City Hospital.45  While performing an 
abortion of an approximately twenty- to twenty-eight-week-old fetus, Edelin 
ended the blood flow to the fetus and then waited three to five minutes before 
removing it from the mother’s body.46  Alleging that Edelin had killed a viable 
fetus, Boston prosecutors charged Edelin with manslaughter, arguing that the 
fetus was a legal person and would have been born alive but for Edelin’s 
conduct.47 
Edelin was clearly a headline trial: media representatives attended the trial 
daily.48  Edelin himself frequently appeared on television and became 
something of a focus for those who supported Roe.49  But before the trial 
began, Edelin had hardly been a celebrity.  Nor were the facts of the case 
particularly titillating or unusual.  Edelin routinely performed abortions at 
Boston’s City Hospital.50  The fetus might have been older, and the procedure 
 
 41. Guerrieri v. State, No. 73 C.A. 19, 1974 Ohio App. LEXIS 3899, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 30, 1974). 
 42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65 (describing other legal entities who could be subject to 
regulation and prosecution prior to Roe). 
 43. For a sample of news coverage of Edelin, see Monroe Anderson, Pro-Life Groups Here 
Laud Edelin Decision, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1975, at 3; Defense Wins Test at Abortion Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1975, at 49; Warren Leary, Boston Doctors Brace Themselves for Right-to-Life 
Battle, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 19, 1974, at A7; John P. MacKenzie, Doctor Trial in Death of Fetus 
Opens, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1975, at A1; Robert Reinhold, Abortion Trial’s Crucial Issue: 
When Does Life Begin?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1975, at 34. 
 44. See Stoler, supra note 6, at 93. 
 45. See Defense Wins Test at Abortion Trial, supra note 43; MacKenzie, supra note 43; 
Reinhold, supra note 43. 
 46. See Reinhold, supra note 43. 
 47. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4, 5 (Mass. 1976); see, e.g., Letter from Frank 
Susman to Robert Sunnen 2  (Feb. 3, 1975), in ACLU Papers, Edelin v. Massachusetts (on file 
with Mudd Library, Rare Books & Manuscripts Div., Princeton Univ.). 
 48. For a sample of the news coverage of the trial, see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 49. For a discussion of one such television appearance, see Letter from Ray White, Exec. 
Director, Nat’l Right to Life Committee, to Woody Frazier, Producer, Mike Douglas Show (Mar. 
26, 1975) (on file with Gerald Ford Mem’l Library) [hereinafter Letter from Ray White to Woody 
Fraizer]. 
 50. Reinhold, supra note 43. 
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he used might have been somewhat atypical, but Edelin had simply performed 
an abortion.  Why, then, did his case become a headline trial? 
Edelin attracted headlines partly because the facts were banal and partly 
because Edelin’s actions seemed to be protected by Roe.  Unlike Verdell 
Wright and Betty Norflett, Edelin was a physician entitled to Roe’s 
protections.51  Moreover, the fetus at issue was most likely twenty to twenty-
eight weeks old, potentially too young to be viable under Roe.52  The question 
was no longer whether abortion was criminal, for Roe had decided that 
question.  Instead, as we shall see, the issue was what Roe actually meant—
who the decision would protect and when. 
The case also became famous because it represented an open challenge to 
Roe.  On the most plausible reading of Roe, criminal prosecutions of doctors 
performing abortions were not permissible, especially when no explicit 
criminal prohibition was passed by a state to put doctors on notice.53  Edelin 
raised the possibility that Roe could be defied or gutted. 
The Edelin litigation was officially pursued by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, but key antiabortion activists like Dr. Mildred Jefferson and Dr. 
Frederick Mecklenburg of the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) 
sponsored, publicized, and participated in the case.54  Jefferson and 
Mecklenburg had been leaders of the anti-abortion movement before Roe.55  
Jefferson was the first African-American woman to graduate from Harvard 
Medical School and had become something of a media darling in the 
antiabortion movement.56  Mecklenburg, meanwhile, was a well-known 
Minnesota obstetrician and gynecologist who had promoted family planning, 
adoption, and other alternatives to abortion.57 
 
 51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–164 (1973) (suggesting that states could not 
criminalize most abortions of non-viable fetuses performed by physicians); see also supra notes 
38–40 and accompanying text (describing prosecutions against Wright and Norflett due to their 
participation in abortion actions as non-physicians). 
 52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (explaining that fetuses achieved viability at twenty-four to twenty-
eight weeks). 
 53. EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO 
CONSENT 92 (1996) (arguing that, among other things, Roe affirmed a woman’s right “to kill the 
fetus at any stage of a medically abnormal pregnancy”). 
 54. See A Fighter for Right to Life, EBONY, Apr. 1978, at 78, 92; Letter from Frank Susman 
to Robert Sunnen, supra note 47, at 4. 
 55. A Fighter for Right to Life, supra note 54, at 78; Religion: The Anti-Abortion Campaign, 
TIME, March 29, 1971, at 72, 73. 
 56. For media coverage of Jefferson in the period, see for example, A Fighter for Right to 
Life, supra note 54, at 78; Anne Chamberlain, The City Politic: Running a Cool Campaign from a 
Small, Hot Kitchen, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 29, 1976, at 9, 11. 
 57. See PENNSYLVANIANS FOR HUMAN LIFE, BIOGRAPHIES OF PERSONS ATTENDING 
CONVENTION OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE IN RIGHT TO LIFE WORK (1972), in Am. Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers (on file with Gerald Ford Mem’l Library).  By late 1974, Mecklenburg 
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As we shall see, the position taken by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and the NRLC was that Roe was valid and that abortion rights 
were deserving of constitutional protection.  However, these groups sought to 
identify abortion rights only as early-term procedures and to protect only 
women’s rights to terminate a pregnancy.58  According to prosecutors, abortion 
rights only permitted women to terminate pregnancies and give up personal 
responsibility for the well-being of fetuses.59  In their view, abortion rights did 
not authorize physicians or women to harm fetuses. 
For her part, Mildred Jefferson defined birth as the moment that the fetus 
was detached from the mother and had to “go on its own systems.”60  
According to Jefferson, abortion rights only permitted women to terminate 
pregnancies and give up personal responsibility for the wellbeing of fetuses.61  
In her view, abortion rights did not authorize physicians or women to harm 
fetuses. 
For his part, Frederick Mecklenburg identified the term “abortion” as 
“applying to procedures only prior to twenty weeks gestation.”62  He suggested 
that any later procedure was not an abortion and was, therefore, not subject to 
constitutional protection.63  Mecklenburg thus recognized abortion rights, but 
argued that those rights did not permit anyone to kill a fetus.64  In opposing a 
motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth summarized this position as follows: 
In Roe v. Wade the Court held inter alia that the “right to privacy. . . is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”  Nowhere did the Court state, or imply that his [sic] right of 
 
and his wife, Marjory, who was also a major antiabortion activist, had distanced themselves from 
the NRLC.  See ARLENE DOYLE, DO YOU NEED PERMISSION TO SAVE AN UNBORN BABY? 9–11 
(1977) (outlining the conflict between the Mecklenburgs and the NRLC leadership).  However, 
the Mecklenburgs remained major players in the antiabortion community in the mid-1970s.  See 
Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg to Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life Board of Directors 
(Sep. 2, 1974), in Am. Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra (describing the Mecklenburgs’ 
involvement in American Citizens Concerned for Life, a major group, in the mid-1970s). 
 58. See Affidavit of the Commonwealth Opposing the Defendant’s Motion for an Order of 
Dismissal of the Indictment Under the Authority of Commonwealth v. Brandano, 1971 Mass. 
Adv. SW. 659, 663, at 49, Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (No. 81823), in ACLU 
Papers, Edelin v. Massachusetts, supra note 47 (describing the idea that abortion rights did permit 
fetal killing) [hereinafter Affidavit of Commonwealth]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Defense Wins Test at Abortion Trial, supra note 43. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Letter from Frank Susman to Robert Sunnen, supra note 47, at 4. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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personal privacy extended to permit anyone to terminate the life of the child, if 
a human being results from the termination of pregnancy.65 
Edelin and his attorney, however, proposed that abortion rights concerned 
not only women and their decision to have an abortion, but also physicians’ 
actions.66  According to Edelin, abortion rights ensured that doctors could 
practice medicine according to the best of their abilities.67  For example, in 
Edelin’s proposed instructions to the jury, Roe and its companion case, Doe v. 
Bolton, were described as follows: 
[F]ollowing the decision in Roe v. Wade . . . . the decision as to whether to 
perform an abortion was one left entirely up to the putative mother and her 
physician and the decision as to how exactly to perform the abortion was one 
left entirely within the doctor’s medical judgment . . . .68 
II.  DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE HEADLINE TRIAL 
Edelin was a headline trial not only because it challenged the dominant 
definition of abortion rights, but also because it demonstrated that abortion-
based convictions continued, Roe notwithstanding: the Boston jury convicted 
Edelin of manslaughter.69  Although he received no prison time, his conviction 
set off a wave of debate.70  Was it fair to prosecute a doctor for performing an 
abortion when the Supreme Court seemed to have legalized abortion?  Did 
Edelin have adequate notice that his conduct was criminal?  Was his conduct 
criminal or was it constitutionally protected?  Editorials in major newspapers 
took a stand on the issue.71 
Members of the antiabortion movement predicted that Edelin was a sign of 
things to come: more abortion prosecutions, more criminal trials, and more 
convictions.72  Indeed, at the time the case was decided, activists like Dr. 
 
 65. Affidavit of the Commonwealth, supra note 58, at 49 (alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 66. See, e.g., Defendant’s Requests for Instructions to the Jury, Commonwealth v. Edelin, 
359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (No. 81823), in ACLU Papers, Edelin v. Massachusetts, supra note 47. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d at 11; see also Anderson, supra note 43 (reporting on the reaction to 
Edelin’s conviction). 
 70. Abortion Conviction of Boston Doctor Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1976, at 1.  On the 
controversy surrounding Edelin’s conviction, see for example, Lawrence E. Altman, Doctor 
Guilty in Death Of a Fetus in Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1975, at 1; Lawrence E. Altman, 
Implications of Abortion Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1975, at 41; Doctor, Convicted in 
Abortion, Charges Prejudice Barred Fair Trial in Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1975, at 41 
[hereinafter Doctor Convicted]; Editorial, Abortion Error, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1975, at 31; John 
Kifner, Abortion Foe Cites Role, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1975, at 41. 
 71. See Editorial, Abortion Error, supra note 70. 
 72. See Anderson, supra note 43. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] EDELIN: THE REMAKING OF THE HEADLINE ABORTION TRIAL 1389 
Joseph Scheidler, the executive director of the Illinois Right to Life 
Committee, believed that the outcome of the trial would shape the abortion 
debate in Congress and the Supreme Court.73 
Edelin’s conviction was ultimately overturned by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, which held that Edelin was not afforded adequate 
notice, that his conduct could be considered criminal, and that there was 
insufficient evidence of “recklessness” to make out a manslaughter claim.74  
However, Edelin could still have seemed like a victory for the antiabortion 
movement.  A jury and trial judge had agreed with the movement’s 
interpretation of Roe, as might future judges and juries.75  Even the Supreme 
Judicial Court had not taken issue with the movement’s interpretation of 
abortion rights.76  For abortion opponents, then, Edelin might have presented a 
roadmap for future headline antiabortion trials. 
Proponents of Roe might also have seen reason to participate in and 
publicize criminal trials like Edelin.  In other contexts, like the campaign for a 
“human life” amendment to the Constitution, supporters of Roe had to address 
disturbing, often graphic images of abortion and fetal death.77  The Edelin trial 
focused equally on seemingly draconian punishments doled out to physicians, 
many of whom could not be sure of when their conduct would be punished.78 
Just as importantly, Edelin himself was a boon to the abortion rights 
movement.  An African-American physician serving an African-American 
patient, Edelin publicly linked abortion with the needs and equality concerns of 
poor, non-white women.79  Conversely, he accused those behind his 
prosecution of harboring racist, sexist, and sectarian biases.80  Since before 
1970, some supporters of legalized abortion had maintained ties with the 
population control movement, a collection of advocates concerned about rising 
birth rates in the United States and abroad.81  Because some population 
controllers appeared to have eugenic or racist motives, supporters of legalized 
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abortion had to defend themselves against charges of racism and race 
genocide.82  Edelin’s case and subsequent media tour buttressed abortion rights 
claims that it was Roe’s opponents, not its proponents, who were the ones 
discriminating on the basis of race. 
Nonetheless, Edelin proved to be the last headline abortion trial of its kind.  
As we shall see, the Supreme Court was not solely responsible for this state of 
affairs.  The era of headline abortion trials ended not simply because the Court 
exercised its vast decriminalization powers.  An end to such trials also required 
that the promotion or publicizing of such trials become politically unappealing 
to advocacy groups on either side of the debate. 
Headline trials like Edelin had been appealing to advocacy groups largely 
because of the public attention they generated.  A trial like Edelin raised the 
salience of the abortion issue and offered activists a platform for publicizing 
their views and the accusations they leveled against their opponents, but it was 
the very same publicity that made headline trials like Edelin dangerous.  
Advocates could not control how the media presented Edelin or how the public 
would respond to the coverage.  Thus, the Edelin trial proved to be a double-
edged sword, winning attention for a group but often generating press that did 
more harm than good.  For this reason, advocacy groups lost interest in the 
headline abortion trial. 
This point becomes clear when we study the effects of Edelin on three of 
the major players in the abortion debate after Roe: the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America (PPFA), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
and the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC). 
III.  PLANNED PARENTHOOD AND THE RISE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
Founded in 1942, Planned Parenthood was the successor to Margaret Sanger’s 
American Birth Control League and became the most influential birth control 
lobby in the United States, providing education and services in clinics operated 
by the organization, offering marriage counseling, and campaigning for the 
reform of laws restricting the distribution or advertisement of contraception.83 
In the 1970s, when Edelin was tried, PPFA had worked to portray itself as an 
organization focused on medical care as well as the harms associated with out-
of-control population growth.84  Formally known as Planned Parenthood-
World Population at the time, the organization sponsored efforts at home and 
 
 82. Id. at 326–29. 
 83. Ziegler, supra note 81, at 305; see generally LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF 
WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 242–78 (3d ed. 2002) (providing 
a historical study of Planned Parenthood). 
 84. See Ziegler, supra note 81, at 306–07. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] EDELIN: THE REMAKING OF THE HEADLINE ABORTION TRIAL 1391 
abroad not only to provide desired contraceptive services but also to guarantee 
sustainable rates of population growth, especially in developing countries.85 
Edelin appealed to Planned Parenthood partly because of the emphasis the 
organization put on physicians’ rights.  In the period leading up to Edelin’s 
trial, Planned Parenthood stayed mostly on the sidelines, becoming involved in 
the months immediately following his conviction.86  Participating in Edelin’s 
appeal, the organization continued to focus on the physicians’ rights claims 
stressed by the Court in Roe and emphasized by Edelin’s counsel at trial.87  In 
its amicus brief supporting Edelin, Planned Parenthood argued that the primary 
right concerned in abortion cases was the right of the physician—”to 
administer treatment according to his professional judgment up to the point 
where [there are] important state interests . . . .”88  Although women’s rights 
and needs were “facilitated” by those of physicians, abortion was not described 
as a matter of sex equality but instead as “a medical matter which is best 
governed by the exercise of physician responsibility.”89 
By contrast, following his conviction, Edelin himself abandoned 
physicians’ rights rhetoric.  In April 1975, Edelin spoke to a gathering of 
supporters at the Chicago Hyatt Regency Hotel and proclaimed that abortion 
was a women’s issue.90  As he explained: “once a woman makes up her mind 
to have an abortion, she should be given professional and highly qualified 
treatment.”91  Edelin had taken the same approach earlier that year at the 
national conference held by the National Abortion Rights Action League 
(NARAL), the nation’s largest single-issue group in favor of legalized 
abortion.92  At the organization’s 1975 conference, Edelin explained: “The 
central issue we’ve all been fighting for is freedom of choice.”93  
Representative Paul McCloskey, another major speaker at the Conference, 
elaborated on this point, describing abortion as a “woman’s ‘right of free 
choice.’”94  According to Edelin himself, the central issue was no longer the 
rights of physicians like himself but instead the needs and concerns of women. 
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Planned Parenthood began stressing arguments about women’s rights in 
the same period.  In May 1975, for the first time, the organization endorsed a 
resolution describing abortion in explicitly feminist terms by stating 
“[p]arenthood ceases to be the primary . . . means to self-fulfillment for 
women, and becomes instead a matter of genuine choice, one among a 
number.”95  In January 1976, the organization approved a measure stating: 
“growing opposition to the Supreme Court Decision on Abortion is an urgent 
and serious threat to the issue of freedom of choice.”96  In June 1976, the 
Board adopted a plan of action on sex equality that described Roe as a 
women’s rights decision.97  By the fall of 1977, the Board was circulating a 
copy of the National Plan of Action that emerged from the celebration of 
International Women’s Year, an event dedicated to analyzing the state of 
women’s rights in the United States and proposing future paths of 
development.98  The Board stressed the parts of these materials describing Roe 
as a decision “which guarantee[s] reproductive freedom to women.”99 
The public spotlight cast by Edelin’s trial made apparent several strategic 
reasons to focus on women’s rights rather than on those of physicians.  First, 
because of the publicity surrounding the trial, Planned Parenthood had 
occasion to rethink the appeal of arguments about physicians’ rights.  In the 
years before Roe, many supporters of legalized abortion believed that 
arguments about physicians’ rights were more moderate and, therefore, more 
likely to persuade legislators, judges, and other members of the political 
mainstream.100  As Dr. Joseph Nellis of NARAL explained in 1971: 
[C]ourts would more easily strike down state anti-abortion laws if the test case 
were presented in terms of interference with the physician’s practice of 
medicine than if it were done on the basis that many women’s rights groups 
have advocated—namely, that anti-abortion laws represent an unconstitutional 
interference with the right of a woman to control her own body.101 
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These arguments had a practical resonance: the federal government played a 
significant role in the funding of domestic and international family planning, 
through programs like the Family Planning Services and Population Research 
Act of 1970 and the activities of the United States Agency for International 
Development.102 
In the spotlight cast by Edelin, members of Planned Parenthood had reason 
to reevaluate the physicians’ rights claims thought to be attractive to elected 
officials and courts.  Not only had a trial court and an attorney general’s office 
sided with the antiabortion movement in Edelin, but in June 1976, Planned 
Parenthood members noted a steep decline in federal family planning aid, both 
in the context of abortion and otherwise.103  Edelin made clear that old allies 
might no longer be available to Planned Parenthood, while new allies, 
especially feminists, had not yet been reached.104 
As importantly, the spotlight cast by the Edelin trial made it clear that 
alliances with the women’s movement would be strategically important to 
Planned Parenthood.  Especially after his conviction came down, many of 
Edelin’s most vocal supporters were feminists.105  Nationally, women’s groups 
also sided with Edelin, as did the Women’s Division of the American Jewish 
Council.106 
In the same period, the women’s movement and its arguments became a 
more established part of the political mainstream: the Equal Rights 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was passed by both houses of Congress, 
President Jimmy Carter established the National Advisory Committee for 
Women during the United States’ hosting of the International Women’s Year 
Conference in 1977, and women’s groups successfully lobbied each of the 
major parties to endorse a number of women’s reforms.107 
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While “women’s arguments” seemed more politically advisable to Planned 
Parenthood, physicians in the same period appeared to be uncertain allies.  
After all, many of the witnesses against Edelin had been physicians.108  Some 
physicians roundly condemned Edelin’s conviction.109  However, the 
conviction served as a reminder that the support of the medical community as a 
whole could not be taken as a given. 
Planned Parenthood’s leadership, thus, had reason to publicize efforts to 
advance the rights of women instead of trials like Edelin’s that focused on 
physicians’ rights.  At the June 1976 meeting of the National Board, Planned 
Parenthood emphasized a measure endorsing women’s rights in all contexts, 
even those unrelated to family planning.110  For example, Marilyn Fowler, a 
member of the Board, explained of the measure: “[W]e want women’s 
organizations.  There’s a lot of political clout out there.  And we’re not getting 
it, because we can’t come out and make this kind of a statement.”111  Lenore 
McIntyre, another Board member, agreed: “[W]e’re going to form coalitions 
with other groups—ask other groups to approve policy statements supporting 
family planning, and all aspects of it.  And I feel that it’s important that we, 
then, support [these statements].”112 
By the time Fowler and McIntyre were speaking, it was clear that there 
was little to be gained for the organization in publicizing trials like Edelin or in 
heavily investing organizational resources in similar headline prosecutions.  
Because women’s rights arguments seemed the most strategically 
advantageous to the leadership of Planned Parenthood, and due to the lack of 
reliance on these issues during court proceedings, the organization lost interest 
in headline trials like Edelin. 
PPFA had expected Edelin to publicize a particular understanding of the 
abortion issue: one that was medical and above the political fray.  Instead, 
media coverage of the trial and public response to it exposed the weakness of 
its medical arguments about abortion.  Edelin might have won publicity for the 
organization, but the leaders of PPFA had found themselves unable to control 
media coverage of the case or the public understanding of it. 
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IV.  THE ACLU AND THE PROBLEM WITH FETAL RIGHTS 
Founded in 1920, the ACLU at the time of the Edelin trial was one of the 
largest civil liberties organizations in existence.113  In the late 1960s, former 
members of the generally more radical New York Civil Liberties Union 
(NYCLU) assumed positions of leadership within the organization.114  While 
members of the NYCLU, Aryeh Neier, Ira Glasser, Alan Levine, and others 
had endorsed a broad civil liberties agenda.115  As Samuel Walker writes, the 
group believed that “[t]he ACLU’s task . . . was to bring promises of the Bill of 
Rights to . . . previously neglected areas of American life.”116  In order to 
achieve this task, the ACLU underwent dramatic expansion, bureaucratization, 
and diversification of interests in the 1970s and 1980s.117 
Edelin appeared immediately attractive to the organization.  The trial fell at 
the intersection of several of the group’s major areas of interest: defendants’ 
rights, due process, abortion rights, and rights to medical treatment.118  
Moreover, the trial cast many of these issues in a light that was sympathetic to 
the ACLU’s cause: Edelin portrayed himself in the national media as a doctor 
committed to serving the needs of poor, minority communities and as a victim 
of a surprise prosecution.119 
The organization involved itself heavily in the early stages of the Edelin 
litigation.  Frank Susman, a key member of the organization, attended every 
day of the trial, reporting back to Jimmye Kimmey and Judith Mears, leaders 
of the national ACLU.120  Mears corresponded with and advised Edelin’s trial 
counsel, William Homans.121  The organization also took a leading role in 
Edelin’s appeal, concluding that “abortion [is] a medical matter which is best 
governed by the exercise of physician responsibility . . . .”122 
The ACLU ultimately lost interest in headline trials like Edelin, however, 
but not because of the decline of physicians’ rights issues.  Instead, as we shall 
see, Edelin revealed that while a significant portion of the national leadership 
of the ACLU supported fetal rights, the organization proved unable to control 
how its own members interpreted Edelin.  Becoming deeply involved in 
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headline abortion trials like Edelin seemed likely to exacerbate already 
damaging divisions within the organization.  Even those supportive of fetal 
rights had reason to avoid further prosecutions like Edelin: these advocates had 
no interest in answering the complex, practical questions that accompanied the 
recognition of fetal rights. 
The issue became apparent in 1976, when the organization’s Privacy 
Committee first addressed the Edelin trial.  In June, the members present were 
divided about the nature of abortion rights, the existence of fetal rights, and the 
proper interpretation of Roe v. Wade.123  Some members of the Committee 
believed that, “if the fetus [was] aborted . . . when the chances for survival are 
high . . .” there might be an obligation for physicians to save the fetus’s life, 
and women’s rights to an abortion might be limited.124  The divisions within 
the organization became plainer at a June 1976 meeting.125  Then, Dr. Irwin 
Kaiser, an obstetrician invited to speak by the Committee, explained to the 
Committee how medical issues might shape privacy rights in the abortion 
context.126  Might abortion rights depend on how much medical knowledge 
was available about the condition of the fetus?127  Would the scope of privacy 
in the context of abortion depend on the technology available to support the 
fetus?128  The Privacy Committee could not reach an agreement on any of these 
questions.129 
If anything, the meeting raised more questions than it answered.  In the 
summary of the meeting, a number of questions offered by Committee 
members were recorded, such as: “If the fetus lives, the question arises as to 
who should support the child—the mother, father or the state?”130  Other 
questions addressed whether mothers would have to sign adoption papers 
before receiving an abortion and whether fathers would have the right to save 
otherwise viable fetuses in which mothers had no interest.131 
Later, in October 1976, the depth of the divisions between those on the 
Committee was on full display.  Member Alvin Schorr argued that the 
Committee should “adopt the position that the right to abort is the right to kill, 
accepting the full implications of the Supreme Court’s definition of 
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abortion.”132  Member Bud Fensterwald argued for “the benefit of deferring to 
the medical profession to make decisions” about the scope and nature of 
privacy rights in the abortion context.133  By contrast, Member Peter Bernbaum 
argued that women’s privacy rights were limited by the rights of the fetus, 
suggesting that “the medical profession should be given the responsibility to 
keep the fetus alive by using reasonable methods.”134 
Divisions within the ACLU about fetal rights were troublesome for several 
reasons.  First, the spotlight cast by Edelin drew the group’s attention to other 
related issues that were dividing the organization.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, 
female members of the national ACLU had criticized the organization’s 
leadership for excluding and potentially even discriminating against women.135  
Advocates like Pauli Murray had called for the organization to adopt a sort of 
affirmative action policy ensuring that women took positions of leadership in 
the organization.136  Future headline trials like Edelin seemed likely to reopen 
divisive conversations about the position the ACLU should and did take on 
women’s issues.137  Indeed, with regard to the Edelin trial, some within the 
organization took the position that women’s reproductive rights had been 
defined too broadly at the expense of fetal rights.138  Because the ACLU was 
already concerned about its reputation for gender discrimination, publicizing or 
participating in more headline trials like Edelin seemed problematic. 
Just as importantly, though, celebrity trials like Edelin were also bringing 
attention to a question that was proving to be troublesome for the national 
ACLU: how to balance the group’s commitment to defendants’ rights with its 
substantive values.  In the same period, this problem emerged in the context of 
rape reform.  In December 1976, ACLU members Gara LaMarche and Faith 
Seidenberg encouraged the organization to begin a campaign against laws 
preventing prosecutions for criminal rape.139  Many members of the ACLU 
Equality Committee saw the issue as one involving sex discrimination.  For 
example, Brenda Feigen Fasteau stated that it was “very difficult to obtain a 
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conviction if any evidence of the victim’s past sexual history is admitted.”140  
LaMarche echoed this concern, stating that it was plainly discriminatory that, 
“in none of the fifty states can a woman charge her husband with rape.”141  
Though sharing Fasteau and LaMarche’s concerns about sex discrimination, 
other members expressed concern that rape reform would give little weight to 
defendants’ rights.142  For this reason, Marshall Beil expressed “reservations 
about whether such injustices should be the province of the criminal law.”143  
Member John Gregory similarly suggested that marital rape might not be fairly 
handled in criminal law by noting that, in family law, “withholding of sex is 
considered grounds for divorce.”144 
Headline trials like Edelin also seemed likely to raise a related and equally 
worrisome problem.  On the one hand, the ACLU Privacy Committee 
supported fetal rights and had endorsed a major resolution in favor of 
recognizing them.145  On the other hand, headline trials raised concerns about 
defendants’ rights issues typically of importantance to the organization, such as 
procedural and due process rights.  Addressing the kinds of issues raised in 
Edelin and trials like it seemed more likely to result in debate and acrimony 
rather than any form of concrete progress. 
Because headline trials like Edelin seemed to be more trouble than they 
were worth, ACLU leaders lost interest in publicizing or participating in 
blockbuster abortion prosecutions.  Any gains in positive publicity seemed 
likely to be outweighed by costly divisions within the organization about fetal 
rights, women’s rights, and defendants’ rights. 
V.  THE NRLC AND THE DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE COURTROOM 
Before 1980, the NRLC was the largest national anti-abortion organization, 
serving as a strategy clearinghouse for state and local groups and playing a 
central role in the Edelin litigation.146  In the same period, in spite of 
successfully obtaining a conviction, the NRLC lost interest in headline trials 
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like Edelin.  The decision not to pursue more prosecutions may seem puzzling.  
Edelin gave many antiabortion advocates a national platform for spreading 
their ideas about fetal rights and the beginning of human life.147  The publicity 
surrounding Edelin’s trial and conviction also suggested to the public that 
some government officials and ordinary citizens agreed with the NRLC’s 
definitions of Roe and of abortion rights.148  Even the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s ruling on appeal in Edelin’s favor seemed to leave a door open 
for future prosecutions: if defendants had adequate notice of the criminality of 
their conduct, a conviction like Edelin’s might be upheld.149 
So why did the NRLC abandon trials like Edelin?  Part of the answer lies 
in the very headline nature of the trial.  In the years immediately following 
Roe, the NRLC worked to broaden the appeal of antiabortion advocacy, 
especially among poor, non-white, or non-Catholic citizens.  For example, in 
criticizing the Family Planning Services and Research Act, Connie Marshner 
of the U.S. Coalition for Life testified extensively about alleged discriminatory 
and manipulative actions taken by pro-abortion physicians against poor, non-
white women.150  For the many women who were “poor and therefore 
dependent on the good will of the State, [choice] [was] a myth,” she 
explained.151  The NRLC and its allies also stressed arguments that proponents 
of legalized abortion were racist, willing to use abortion to commit “race 
genocide” and reduce the number of African-American children being born.152 
In the same period, the NRLC tried to establish that the antiabortion 
movement had a broad base and was not exclusively Catholic.  Toward this 
end, in 1973, the group formally separated itself from the Catholic Church.153  
Throughout the 1970s, the group’s newsletter, National Right to Life News, 
publicized stories intended to show the opposition of a number of religious 
denominations to legalized abortion.154  In 1975, the group also appointed Dr. 
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Mildred Jefferson as president.155  As indicated in strategy papers of the 
Committee to Defend Pro-Life Group, the NRLC encouraged Jefferson to take 
a leadership role partly in order to demonstrate that the antiabortion movement 
was independent from the Catholic Church and appealed to non-Catholics.156  
Jefferson offered a dramatically different image of anti-abortion advocacy: 
whereas the public associated anti-abortion advocacy with white, Catholic, 
male religious leaders, Jefferson was a female, African-American, Methodist 
physician.157 
Dr. Edelin’s trial cast doubt on the NRLC’s claims to defend racial 
equality and to reject sectarian bias.  In the press, Edelin cast himself as a hero 
to poor, non-white women to whom reproductive health services had been 
denied.158  Further, after his conviction, Edelin told the press that the verdict 
against him was the product of racial discrimination.159  The press often 
mentioned that Edelin was the first African-American chief resident at 
Boston’s City Hospital, sometimes insinuating that prosecutors had targeted 
Edelin on that basis.160  Insofar as race relations were concerned, Edelin was a 
public relations disaster for the NRLC. 
The publicity surrounding Edelin also damaged the legitimacy of the 
NRLC’s claims to be nonsectarian.  The press made a good deal of the fact that 
the Edelin trial was held in Boston, thought to be the most Catholic town in the 
United States.161  Newspapers like the New York Times suggested that the 
Edelin verdict was anomalous, the product of Catholic bias.162  Because of the 
allegations of racism and Catholic bias, the NRLC had reason to avoid further 
headline trials like Edelin.  Such a headline trial seemed likely to revive the 
damaging accusations tied to Edelin itself. 
As early as 1975, Edelin had proven to be a public-relations disaster for the 
NRLC on these grounds.  In May 1975, for example, Edelin appeared on the 
Mike Douglas Show.163  No antiabortion spokesperson was permitted to 
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speak.164  When Edelin was asked why he had agreed to appear, Flip Wilson, a 
well-known comedian, spoke up, saying that Edelin had come on the program 
because he was “black, beautiful and innocent.”165  Studio employees then 
cued the audience to cheer.166 
Ray White, then the executive director of the NRLC, unsuccessfully 
petitioned some media outlets to change the tenor of their coverage.  White had 
already recognized the damage done by Edelin’s trial: “The Edelin case has 
been highly publicized . . . . There are those who want to label it as racial 
persecution, which it is not since the victim who lost his life was . . . 
black . . . .”167 
The press Edelin generated was so devastating that, following Edelin’s 
successful appeal, the NRLC formally distanced itself from the whole affair.  
In 1977, Mildred Jefferson, then President of the group,  suggested in National 
Right to Life News that the NRLC had merely observed the Edelin trial rather 
than participating in or promoting it.  She explained: “I do not agree with those 
who see the reversal of the Edelin conviction . . . as a ‘defeat’ for the right-to-
life movement.”168  Jefferson was right that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, not the NRLC, had prosecuted Edelin.  However, NRLC 
leaders had promoted the case and served as key witnesses for the 
prosecution.169  The lengths to which Jefferson went to disavow any 
connection to the case show how damaging the publicity generated by Edelin 
was to the movement. 
Moreover, the publicity surrounding Edelin made clear that not all 
grassroots activists or politicians sympathetic to the NRLC approved of the 
tactical approach used in Edelin.  In Congress, anti-abortion politicians did not 
argue that Roe and fetal rights were incompatible.  Instead, they offered a 
series of constitutional amendments—the Buckley, Hogan, and Helms 
Amendments, in particular—stating the Constitution would need to be 
amended in order to recognize fetal rights from the moment of conception.170  
In rallying the support of new and old allies, the NRLC seemed more likely to 
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benefit from criticizing aspects of Roe than the group did in pursuing a strategy 
like the one used in Edelin. 
By the end of the decade, the NRLC and the groups opposing it had 
generally lost interest in publicizing or participating in trials like Edelin.  The 
NRLC seemed to have had every reason to support the prosecution of abortion 
providers and to benefit from the press attention that such trials generated.  
However, the organization could not control how the media portrayed them or 
even the NRLC itself.  Edelin became a touchy subject for leaders like 
Jefferson, who pretended to have been at most superficially involved in the 
prosecution. 
The lessons of the Edelin trial, then, seem to be twofold.  One is an 
observation about the practical value of headline trials for interest groups.  To 
the extent that Edelin is an example, such trials might undermine a group’s 
cause as much as advance it.  Headline trials generate news coverage and 
public debate.  Advocacy groups are not necessarily in the best position to 
control or shape the publicity surrounding such trials. 
A second lesson is about the power of the Roe Court.  It is a mistake to 
assume that Roe alone ended abortion prosecutions or even headline trials like 
Edelin.  These trials continued after Roe had been handed down.  The Court 
alone did not end the era of the headline abortion trial.  That required the 
cooperation of the social movement communities most centrally involved in 
abortion debate. 
CONCLUSION 
The story of the Edelin trial differs from the conventional account of the 
relationship between Roe and criminal trials.  Before Roe, criminal abortion 
trials aroused public interest for several reasons.  These trials spun tales of 
seduction, corruption, and despair.  Some trials told stories about the dark side 
of the medical profession.  Others offered almost unbelievable narratives about 
murder, suicide, and unrequited love. 
Roe is thought to have put an end to this sort of colorful trial.  Because of 
the power exercised by the Supreme Court, criminal prohibitions on abortion 
became a thing of the past, and almost all headline abortion trials became 
unconstitutional. 
However, as we have seen, the conventional story of the headline abortion 
trial is incomplete.  First, Roe did not end criminal abortion trials so much as it 
transformed them.  Edelin was a headline abortion trial.  Dr. Kenneth Edelin’s 
story received daily coverage, and simply because of his trial, the doctor 
himself became a kind of celebrity. 
But instead of demonstrating when criminal prohibitions on abortion 
would be enforced, abortion trials now served as a battleground where the 
meaning of abortion rights could be contested.  Antiabortion advocates in the 
NRLC argued that Roe entitled women only to terminate their personal 
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responsibility for a fetus but permitted no one, and especially not a doctor, to 
destroy a fetus.  Edelin and his legal team contended instead that Roe protected 
doctor’s rights to practice medicine as they saw fit.  Edelin proved to be a 
contest about what Roe meant. 
It is clear, then, that Roe alone could not and did not end the era of the 
headline abortion trial.  Those trials vanished not simply because of the sheer 
power of the Court.  The true end of an era came when competing advocacy 
groups abandoned the headline abortion trial.  Different groups became 
disenchanted with headline trials for various reasons, but each one suffered 
because of the unpredictability of the news coverage and the public’s 
understanding of what was going on.  Edelin suggested to these groups that 
there was such a thing as bad press, and each organization avoided publicizing 
or participating in trials like Edelin after that point. 
The story of Edelin, like the story of the criminal abortion trial, is a 
complex one, then.  It is the story of the power as well as the impotence of 
advocacy groups.  It is also at least in part a story about Roe itself.  And that 
story is as much about the limits of judicial power as it is one about the 
dangers of judicial overreaching. 
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